A linear solution to the effective four-dimensionality problem by Trifonov, Vladimir
ar
X
iv
:p
hy
sic
s/0
30
10
44
v6
  [
ph
ys
ics
.ge
n-
ph
]  
9 F
eb
 20
06
A linear solution to the effective
four-dimensionality problem
Vladimir Trifonov
AMS
trifonov@member.ams.org
Updated version of
A Linear Solution Of The Four-Dimensionality Problem
Europhysics Letters 32(8), 1995, pp. 661-626
Abstract
In this note we formalize certain aspects of observation process
in an attempt to link the logic of the observer with properties of the
observables structures. It is shown that an observer with Boolean logic
perceives her environment as a four-dimensional Lorentzian manifold.
Introduction.
Topos theory ([1], [6], [7], [2], [4], [3]) offers an independent (of the set the-
ory) approach to the foundations of mathematics. Topoi are categories with
set-like objects, function-like arrows and Boolean-like logic algebras. Han-
dling these generalized sets and functions in a topos may differ from that
in classical mathematics (i.e. the topos Set of sets): there are non-classical
versions of mathematics, each with its non-Boolean version of logic. One
possible view on topoi is this: abstract worlds, universes for mathematical
discourse, inhabitants (observers) of which may use non-Boolean logics in
their reasoning. From this viewpoint the main business of classical physics
is to construct models of the universe with a given bivalent Boolean model
of the observer, and choose the most adequate one. In a sense, our task is
inverse: with a given model of the universe, to construct models of the ob-
server, and find out how the observer’s perception of the universe changes if
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his logic is changed. Thus, not the universe itself, but rather its differential
is what interests us here.
Remark 0.1. For structural clarity we use ✷ at the end of a proof, and each
example ends with △. To conclude a remark we use the diamond sign. ✸
1 Actions.
We start by describing the observer’s interactions (actions and observations)
with the environment. The major intuition-based attribute of actions (ele-
mentary influences of the observer upon the environment) is that they can be
associatively composed (i.e. performed in sequence), the compositions also
being actions, and there is an identity action (changing nothing). The set
of the observer’s actions (or effectors), together with an associative compo-
sition, is his motor domain.
Example 1.1. In quantum theory the observer’s actions are represented by
operators on a linear space and constitute, together with an associative com-
position, a semi-group with an identity (monoid). △
2 Observations.
The major intuition-based property of observations (mental and visual pic-
tures of fragments of reality and appearance) is their ability to be superposed,
with some real (later we shall generalize the situation for an arbitrary field
F) weight factors, assigned by the observer to each item. Intuitively, they
measure the participatory degree of observations in a particular observa-
tional situation. Formally, there are two algebraic operations on the set of
observations: addition and multiplication (by reals). The set of observations
(or reflexors), together with the two operations, is the observer’s sensory
domain.
Example 2.1. Spacetime S of special relativity can be interpreted as the set of
observations (mental and visual images of events) of an observer: he considers
nearby events as superpositions of some observations taken with some real
weight factors (decomposition of an event in a basis). Since S is a real linear
space, there are, indeed, two operations on it - addition and multiplication
by reals. △
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3 Combining actions with observations.
No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phe-
nomenon (observations are actions). This simply means that obtaining con-
structive information about reality changes its appearance. Observations are
combined with actions into new entities, called by constructivists states of
knowledge: any rational observer performs an action in accordance to, and
interprets an observation on the basis of, his particular state of knowledge.
It is said that rational knowledge consists of two fundamental (sensory and
motor) components.
4 Paradigm.
We shall call the set of a observer’s states of knowledge his paradigm. Ob-
servations, then, induce superposition of states of knowledge (extensive ac-
quisition or accumulation of knowledge), and actions induce associative com-
position (intensive acquisition or elevation of knowledge). Taking into ac-
count weight factors, we get another operation, the protensive acquisition
of knowledge. Thus we have three operations on the observer’s paradigm,
which endows it with an algebraic structure. The linear case of this structure
is, of course, a real linear associative algebra A with an identity. The sensory
domain SA then is the additive linear space of the algebra, and the motor
domain MA is, one would say, its multiplicative monoid M . However, it is
not terribly easy to interpret 0 (the zero of the algebra) as an action. The
identity 1 of the algebra is the identity action, but what is 0? We would
rather take M \ 0 as the motor domain, but in the former a composition of
two actions is not always an action (i.e. M \0 is not always a monoid), which
violates the intuitive notion of action and, moreover, will not let us define the
logic of the observer. To make a compromise, we assume that MA = M \ 0
if the latter is a monoid, otherwise MA = M . In other words, the motor
domain is the monoid generated by the set of non-zero elements of M .
5 Comprehension signature.
The operations defining the paradigm can be described by its (algebraic)
signature, i. e., the set of operation symbols Σ := {+, ·, 0, 1} ∪ R, each with
its arity, a natural number. For example the arity of the symbols + and · is
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2, while 0 and 1 both have arity 0 (they are constants). Each real number
r ∈ R is an operation symbol of arity 1. The algebraic signature together
with a set of equations specifying behavior of linear algebras over a field F is
referred to as the comprehension signature of the observer.
6 Time.
We employ the constructivistic concept of time: a fundamental attribute
of thought process, the basis to distinguish one entity from another. No
statement on time being a physical property of the universe is made. Con-
structivists describe time as a partial order on the set of states of knowledge.
So do we, slicing the paradigm with a one-form τ˜ (time gradient or ether
form) on its sensory domain, which partially orders states of knowledge by
the standard ordering of the set R of reals.
7 Metric.
An observer’s natural ability to estimate angles and distances between ob-
servations is represented by a metric on his sensory domain SA. We do not
force metrics into the scheme because a natural metric is defined automat-
ically, once the ether form of the observer is known, as follows. Each real
algebra A is completely defined by the structure constant tensor A(ω˜; a, b) on
its additive linear space SA. Tensor A is a multilinear function of two vector
arguments a, b and a one-form argument ω˜. Choosing a particular one-form
τ˜ (i. e. ether form) on SA makes the tensor A(τ˜ ; a, b) depend only on the
vector arguments. Thus, if A(τ˜ ; a, b) is symmetric in a and b, it is a (proper-
or pseudo-)Euclidean metric on SA.
8 The environment.
We assume that the universe consists of interacting systems. Each system is
represented by its states. Given all states of a system, it is defined completely.
Some different systems may have the same states (common states). A system
X is a subsystem of a system Y if all states of X are common to X and Y .
If two systems are subsystems of each other, it is natural to consider them
equal. Given two systems X and Y , we can consider a system Z (the union X
Boolean Obrservers 5
and Y whose states are all states of X and all states of Y . For two systems X
and Y with common states there is a system Z (the intersection of X and Y
whose states are their common states. A system X that can have only states
that Y cannot, is the complement of Y . The behavior of the ontological pair
(system, state) resembles that of (set, element) in na¨ıve set theory, although
conceptually they are very different. Two systems interact if states of one
system depend on states of the other one, which is described as a function in
set-theoretic terms. Thus, with systems as sets and interactions as functions,
the category Set serves as a first-order model of the environment axioms.
9 The proper universe.
The observer’s actions change states of a system i.e. any action a induces
a map X → X , and we have the influence of the observer with the motor
domain M on a system X as a realization of the monoid M in the set X ,
i.e. a map λ, assigning to each a ∈ M a function fa : X → X such that:
fa ◦ fb = fab, and fe is the identity map i.e. fe(x) = x, ∀x ∈ X, e is the
identity of M . A pair (X, λ), where λ is a realization of a monoid M in a set
X , is called anM-system. The collection M •Set of allM-systems describes
all possible influence of a observer with the motor domainM on the universe.
M •Set is a topos in which arrows (X, λ)→ (Y, µ) are realization preserving
maps f : X → Y , i.e. such, that the following diagram commutes for each
a ∈M :
X
f
−−−→ Y
λa
y
yµa
X
f
−−−→ Y
.
The principle of active comprehension (the logic of an observer is developed
in his interaction with the environment) defines the proper universe as the
topos M • Set and assigns to the observer its logic and mathematics.
10 Technical setup.
The intuition-based concepts we used above are logically prior to physics.
Each is elementary in the sense that it is just several steps from the set and
category axioms. To compare, the notion of smooth manifold (a starting
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point for the working physicist) is far more complicated. Let us describe the
above outline a bit more precisely.
Definition 10.1. Let F be a partially ordered field, called a protensity.
For a protensity F, the (Boolean) F-observer is the category A[F] of linear
algebras over F, with objects called paradigms and arrows called shifts. For a
paradigm A states of knowledge are elements of the algebra A. The additive
linear space SA of the algebra A is the sensory domain, with elements called
reflexors. The dual space S∗A is the temporal domain with elements called
ether forms.
Remark 10.1. Intuitively, we are to think of F as the syntax of the observer’s
language of thought. ✸
Definition 10.2. For a paradigm A, a principal metric is the structure con-
stant tensor A together with an ether form τ˜ , provided A(τ˜ ; a, b) is symmetric
in vector arguments a and b.
Remark 10.2. A paradigm may have several metrics or it may have none. ✸
Definition 10.3. The motor domain is the multiplicative subgroupoid MA
of the algebra A, generated by the set of all non-zero elements of A. The
elements of MA are referred to as effectors. A paradigm A is (ir)rational
if MA is (not) a monoid. If A is a rational paradigm and the topos of MA
realizations, MA • Set, is Boolean, the paradigm A is consistent. The topos
MA • Set is the proper universe (or the monocosm) of the paradigm A.
Remark 10.3. The environment (Set) is a topos of realizations of a single-
element monoid, therefore it is the proper universe of an absolutely objective
paradigm whose motor domain contains the identity action only. Informally,
any absolutely objective observer is absolutely inert. ✸
Definition 10.4. A consistent paradigm of maximal finite dimensionality, if
it exists, is a home paradigm.
11 R-observer.
We now apply this scheme to the Boolean R-observer. The conclusion we
shall obtain is that SA is Minkowski space.
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Theorem 11.1. For each home paradigm of the Boolean R-observer, its
sensory domain is four-dimensional, and each principal metric is Lorentzian.
Proof. If, for a paradigm H , the logic of the topos MH •Set is Boolean then
MH is a group ([3], p. 121). Therefore H is associative, with an identity and
without zero divisors. Any such H is isomorphic to the quaternion algebra
(see [5]). Hence 0 6∈ MH (0 has no inverse) i. e., the motor domain MH is
isomorphic to the group of nonzero quaternions H. Thus a home paradigm
exists, and any such paradigm is four-dimensional. For a basis eβ in SH let
tβ be the components of a one-form τ˜ in the dual basis e
β (the indices run
from 0 to 3). Then components Gαβ of the principal metric G = H(τ˜ ; a, b)
are
Gαβ = H(τ˜γe
γ; eα, eβ) = τ˜γH(e
γ ; eα, eβ) = τ˜γH
γ
αβ , (1)
where Hγαβ are the components of H. They are easily found in the canionical
basis of unit quaternions 1, i, j, k:
Gαβ =


τ˜0 τ˜1 τ˜2 τ˜3
τ˜1 −τ˜0 τ˜3 −τ˜2
τ˜2 −τ˜3 −τ˜0 τ˜1
τ˜3 τ˜2 −τ˜1 −τ˜0

 .
Since it must be symmetric, we demand nontrivial symmetry τ˜1 = −τ˜1, τ˜2 =
−τ˜2, τ˜3 = −τ˜3, which yields τ˜1 = τ˜2 = τ˜3 = 0. Thus for each τ ∈ R \ {0}, H
has a principal metric of signature 2, generated by an ether form τ˜ with the
components (τ, 0, 0, 0) in the canonical basis, which concludes the proof.
Remark 11.1. Once the ether form τ˜ generates a metric, the latter in turn
generates time in its standard sense. If we ignore the motor structure of the
paradigm, four-dimensionality and Lorentz metric become axioms, which is
the case in both quantum mechanics and relativity. ✸
12 Spacetime.
Since the environment Set is a Boolean topos, we can separate a Boolean part
- the most objective, in a sense, in any rational paradigm A. A natural can-
didate is the group A of invertible elements of A. For any finite-dimensional
rational paradigm A of R-observer, A is a Lie group. The sensory domain
can be identified with the tangent space at the identity e of A, SA ∼= TeA.
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If A has a principal metric G, then it can be naturally extended over A in a
number of ways, endowing it with a (pseudo- or proper-)Riemannian struc-
ture (see [8] for the explicit computations), so it can be considered as the
(observable) spacetime of the paradigm A.
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